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DLD-329 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 07-2066
________________
DAPHNE RODENBAUGH
          Appellant
   v.
FRANCES CARARCO
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-02383)
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley
____________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 2, 2007
Before:  BARRY, AMBRO and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: August 13, 2007 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Daphne Rodenbaugh appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders denying her
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissing her complaint for failure to pay
2the filing fee.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Redmond v. Gill,
352 F.3d 801, 803 (3d Cir. 2003), and review the District Court’s rulings for abuse of
discretion, see United States v. Holiday, 436 F.2d 1079, 1079 (3d Cir. 1971).  Because the
District Court’s failure to explain the basis for its IFP denial prevents us from conducting
that review, we will vacate and remand for further proceedings.
In this Circuit, IFP determinations are made solely on the basis of indigence,
without regard to the potential merit of a complaint.  See Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1084 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir.
1990).  We have, however, left open the possibility that “‘extreme circumstances’ might
justify denying an otherwise [financially] qualified affiant leave to proceed [IFP],”
although “we have not delineated the circumstances that might be sufficiently ‘extreme’
to justify denial[.]”  Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1084 n.1.
In this case, Rodenbaugh’s IFP affidavit states that her monthly income exceeds
her monthly expenses only by approximately $70.  It further states that she has
approximately $1,800 in three bank accounts (although she later asserted in her motion
for reconsideration that $1,600 of that amount is “set aside” for car and car insurance
payments).  The District Court’s filing fee is $350.
The District Court, with no explanation, entered an order denying IFP status and
directing Rodenbaugh to pay the filing fee.  When Rodenbaugh moved for re-
consideration, the District Court denied that motion, again with no explanation why it had
We also note that Rodenbaugh, as a non-prisoner, is not subject to § 1915(g), and1
that § 1915(e)(2) sets forth grounds for dismissing a complaint after IFP status has been
granted, not for denying IFP status in the first place.
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denied IFP status.  Finally, after Rodenbaugh failed to pay the filing fee by the specified
date, the District Court entered its final order dismissing her complaint, once again
providing no explanation why it had denied IFP status.
Unfortunately, the District Court’s failure to provide any explanation of its
rationale for denying IFP status prevents us from determining the basis on which it
exercised its discretion.  The District Court may, for example, have determined that
Rodenbaugh is financially ineligible for IFP status.  Alternatively, the District Court may
have believed that some other factor constituted an “exceptional circumstance”
warranting the denial of IFP status for non-financial reasons.  We also cannot exclude the
possibility that the District Court denied IFP status for some other reason, and express no
opinion on the merits of these or any other issues.  We note them merely to point out that
the District Court’s orders leave us with no way of knowing the basis for its decision.1
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
